story on the murder of Bousquet, the headline in L'Humanite did not mention the name of the former head of Vichy's police but simply affirmed: "The trial of Vichy remains to be carried out." Other newspapers, citing the need for such a trial, called for an acceleration of proceedings against Paul Touvier and Maurice Papon, two other Frenchmen charged with crimes against humanity for their actions against Jews during the Occupation. When Touvier was finally tried in the Yvelines Court in the spring of 1994, however, many felt the trial was just a poor substitute for the Bousquet trial that never took place. In Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas, Henry Rousso and Eric Conan refer repeatedly to the sentiment felt by many that Touvier was tried faute de mieux, and assert that "the shadow of the impossible trial of Rene Bousquet" hung uncomfortably over the courtroom (Conan and Rousso 141) . In the spring of 1996, in an interview published in the Parisian daily Liberation, Maurice Papon stated that he saw "only advantages" in putting Vichy on trial, but that he had no wish to serve as a "scapegoat" for those he considered to be the real guilty parties. According to Papon, the culprits were those who put French forces, and the French police in particular, at the disposal of the Nazis. Obviously, Papon was pointing the finger at Bousquet.2 There are a number of misperceptions attendant upon the notion that the trial of Rend Bousquet for crimes against humanity would, or could, somehow have constituted a symbolic, necessary, and indeed cathartic trial of Vichy, complete with a clear-cut and unambiguous verdict. First, to the extent that one can try a regime by prosecuting representative individuals, Vichy had already been tried, albeit imperfectly, during the postwar Purge.' Among those tried and convicted, moreover, was Bousquet himself, who stood trial before the High Court in 1949 for his actions as head of Vichy police during the Occupation. It was this trial to which Francois Mitterrand conveniently and misleadingly referred in the fall of 1994 when his own Vichy past and his postwar friendship with Bousquet created a national scandal.4 Given that Bousquet had already been 2 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1999] . He went on to claim that French justice was "particularly severe" at the time, although any number of reliable historical sources confirm that the opposite was, in fact, the case. For instance, in her biography of Bousquet, Pascale Froment affirms that at the moment Bousquet's case was placed on the docket of the High Court, "the great wind" of the Purge had subsided, and if amnesty's moment had not fully arrived, it was nevertheless in the air (Froment 493) . In fact, during the course of the trial itself, the Queuille government announced a first large-scale amnesty plan for those guilty of collaboration, a plan with which the jurors, all legislators themselves, were certainly familiar. The government spokesperson announcing the plan was, moreover, the young Secretary of State for Information-one Francois Mitterrand (Golsan 17 (Froment 500) . Members of the court were undoubtedly aware of Queuille's interest in the case.
Political cronyism was not the sole political factor which softened the court's attitude toward Bousquet. Among the jurors and magistrates, Communists were no longer present, the party having decided that the High Court was too lenient in its treatment of collaborators. Justice, they believed, could no longer be served (Froment 495 1942.12 As to the third German objective, the infiltration of the French police, other testimony at the trial itself suggests that Bousquet was most helpful to the Germans here as well. In the context of what was referred to as the "mission Desloges," testimony confirmed that Bousquet had aided the Nazis in their efforts to infiltrate and destroy Resistance communications networks by providing them with false French identity papers and allowing them to use official police radiocommunications in relaying information to Germany (Rajsfus 92) . French police were also assigned to assist the Germans in their endeavors. Even if episodes such as this had not occurred, it is hard to imagine why such infiltration would even make much of a difference, given the practical and even ideological alliance between the two police forces established at the behest of Bousquet.
In turning to the final Nazi objective as defined by Bousquet, the support of Darquier de Pellepoix and the CGQJ, the defendant is explicit in his claim of having weakened Darquier and his agency by suppressing the anti-Jewish police and by marginalizing the CGQJ
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1999] As the historical record shows, the vast majority of Bousquet's testimony is sheer fantasy. Despite his claims of having been a hostile and persistent opponent of the Nazis and their plans, Bousquet in fact curried favor with them and, almost without reservation, supported Nazi intentions from the outset. Karl Oberg, head of the SS in France, described Bousquet as a "precious collaborator" and, at the moment of the Liberation in 1944, sent two of his personal cars to transport "his friend" Bousquet, his family, and their belongings to Germany. Once there, the family resided in a villa which had formerly housed the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Graciano Ciano.
If Bousquet misrepresented in his testimony the spirit of his personal dealings with the Nazis, such distortions pale in comparison with the extent to which he deceived the court on the subject of his negotiations with the former concerning the deportations of the Jews, as well as the real consequences of those negotiations. The roundups of the Velodrome d'Hiver in July 1942, in which some 13 ,000 people were arrested and deported, are completely elided. So, too, are the roundups of the Old Port area in Marseille in January 1943. There is, moreover, no mention of the fact that when Catholic cardinals and bishops protested the inhumanity of the summer 1942 roundups, Bousquet had the ingenious idea of threatening to eliminate state subventions to parochial schools in order to silence them (Conan 32) . But perhaps the biggest lacuna, and the one which would eventually make possible a trial for crimes against humanity, was any reference to, or testimony concerning a meeting between German representatives and Bousquet, the sole French representative present, on July 2, 1942. It was the German minutes of this meeting, not included in the 1949 criminal dossier, which provided the most damaging evidence against Bousquet in the nineties. 13 What the account of the meeting confirms, first of all, is that Bousquet never sought to protect foreign Jews interned or hiding in
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